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On 25 May 2012, Shenzhen announced the Comprehensive Plan toreform the Special Economic Zone’s land administration system(Shenzhen shi tudi guanli zhidu gaige zongti fang’an 深圳市土地
管理制度改革总体方案) in a move that has been referred to as the city’s
“third land reform” (disanci tugai 第三次土改). The Comprehensive Plan was
formally published on 4 July along with two related documents, namely a
Near-Term Implementation Plan covering the period 2012 to 2015 (“Shen-
zhen shi tudi guanli zhidu gaige zongti fang’an” jinqi shishi fang’an 〈深圳
市土地管理制度改革总体方案〉近期实施方案) and a Notice on the setting
up of a guiding committee to steer and supervise the undertaking of land
reform (Guanyu chengli Shenzhen shi tudi guanli zhidu gaige lingdao xiaozu
de tongzhi 关于成立深圳市土地管理制度改革领导小组的通知).
In 1987, the nation’s first land auction took place in Shenzhen marking
the “first land reform” in post-socialist China. Subsequently, the Special Eco-
nomic Zone has taken the lead in experimenting with new land-related poli-
cies. The spotlight of the municipal government’s latest announcement falls
on the prevalent problem of minor property rights housing (xiao chanquan
fang 小产权房). Minor property rights housing is an unofficial term referring
to illegal residential structures built on rural, collectively-owned land that
is sold or rented to non-local urbanites. Its controversial legal status stems
from the dual ownership structure in China’s land regime. According to Ar-
ticle 8 of the Land Administration Law, the state claims ownership of urban
land, while land in rural and suburban areas is owned, unless otherwise stip-
ulated, collectively by rural residents represented by peasant collectives.
Rural collective land is theoretically reserved for the exclusive use of vil-
lagers, and should be not sold, transferred, or leased to non-rural residents.
The real estate boom and successive hikes in property prices have never-
theless provided strong incentives for rural landowners to capture the mon-
etary benefits of urban development through selling and leasing land and
houses to urbanites looking for affordable accommodation.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, minor property rights housing began to
emerge in the fringes of major cities, and it proliferated in the early 2000s
as housing prices experienced dramatic increases nationwide. By 2007, 18
percent of the 400 residential developments on sale in Beijing were minor
property rights projects. (1) In Shenzhen, minor property rights housing ac-
counts for 56 percent of all housing units and accommodates about half of
the city’s population. (2) As of the end of 2011, Shenzhen had an estimated
379,400 minor property rights houses covering approximately half of the
city’s total construction area. (3)
On the supply side, minor property rights housing is usually jointly devel-
oped by villagers’ committees, local governments at the township level, and
land developers. Because minor property rights are not recognised by the
central state and are hence not a legal right protected by law, buyers do
not receive the officially recognised property ownership certificate
(fangchan zheng 房产证) upon transaction. Instead, township governments
and villager committees produce their own papers such as “township prop-
erty ownership certificates” (xiang chanquan zheng 乡产权证), “village prop-
erty ownership certificates” (cun chanquan zheng 村产权证), and “villagers’
jointly-built housing documents” (cunmin lianhe jianfang xieyi 村民联合建
房协议) as substitutes for formal documentation, in contravention of the
Constitution and land laws. (4)
On the demand side, minor property rights housing provides a much-wel-
comed low-cost alternative, in particular for the middle and lower income
group. A study by Paik and Lee finds that most minor property rights housing
is 50 to 80 percent cheaper than commercial apartments, even in proximate
locations. (5) For the middle-income group, minor property rights apartments
offer larger living space at less cost. Figures from Beijing in 2007 show that
a home buyer could afford a 40-square-meter house inside the Fifth Ring
Road for about 300,000 yuan, but for the same amount of money he or she
could get a 100-square-meter apartment with no official property rights at
the same location. (6) The living environment is not necessarily poorer. An
investigative report by Nanfeng Chuang magazine shows that minor prop-
erty rights neighbourhoods in Shenzhen are almost indistinguishable in ap-
pearance from commercial residential areas, while offering apartments at
half the price. (7) Many people are therefore willing to trade formal rights for
more comfortable living.
Minor property rights housing has also been fulfilling the important func-
tion of providing shelter for those in the lower strata of society. Housing
need is aggravated by problems encumbering government-subsidised hous-
ing projects launched by the state. The central government has announced
plans to build 3.6 million units of guaranteed housing for the urban poor,
but a study conducted by Caixin last year revealed that subsidised housing
is still too expensive for the least well-off in large metropolises such as Bei-
jing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen. New complexes completed under
the rubric of targeted affordable housing have instead been sold to groups
holding privileged status within the government and to high-income earn-
ers, remaining out of reach for the intended low-income group. (8)
Why is minor property rights housing cheaper? According to formal pro-
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cedures, township governments and village committees are required to pay
a substantial land transfer fee (churang jin出让金) to higher-level govern-
ments when they wish to convert their rural collective land to state-owned
land for commercial and construction purposes. Because the development
of minor property rights housing is often not reported, or at least not for-
mally acknowledged, this fee is not paid and developers also avoid a host
of taxes and fees applicable to other profit-making activities. (9)
Minor property rights housing is thus the product of an exceptional con-
vergence of interests between lower-level government officials and the non-
elites. Paik and Lee argue that it “brings a rare opportunity for grassroots
officials, entrepreneurs, and ordinary citizens to find a manner of co-exis-
tence.” (10) They conceptualise this as a positive-sum coalition game that
provides an alternative model of state-society interaction to the near zero-
sum game of exploitative land expropriation that is the usual focus of the
urban development literature on China.
In violent land grabs, local governments and developers benefit at the
expense of peasants, who are forcefully evicted and displaced. (11) Research
by O’Brien and Li shows that victims usually direct their grievances at local
cadres, viewing them as “self-serving, predatory, and high-handed,” but
generally attribute good intentions to central government leaders. (12)
O’Brien and Li coin the term “rightful resistance” to describe rural protes-
tors’ tactic of citing laws and authoritative communications espoused by
the centre to challenge local power-holders with the gap between rights
promised and rights delivered, while vouching their allegiance to the cen-
tre’s ideals.
While the relationship between rural residents and local officials is highly
confrontational in the case of forced land expropriation, in the develop-
ment of minor property rights housing rural residents are much more will-
ing, indeed eager, to work with local officials. They are less resistant to
having their land expropriated, as they enjoy considerable financial gain
not only in the form of compensation for expropriation but also from
favourable profit-sharing arrangements. In legal commercial housing de-
velopments, land developers take the biggest cut of profits (40-50 percent),
while township governments and village committees get 20-30 percent.
Rural residents usually receive only 5-10 percent of the profits. In the case
of minor property rights housing, rural residents get almost half of the prof-
its, while local governments and land developers each receive about a quar-
ter. (13) Rural residents thus have a keen interest in cooperating with local
officials even as they jointly defy the centre’s laws and regulations, con-
stituting what Paik and Lee term “unrightful resistance.” Indeed, in the tran-
sitioning land regime and real estate market, well-informed peasants are
“adapting to the changing economic and political environment and max-
imizing their interests accordingly, ready to cooperate with anyone, includ-
ing yesterday’s enemy, the local governments.” (14) They are increasingly
able to take advantage of the multi-level structure of the Chinese state
apparatus and align with different actors under different circumstances to
aggrandize personal gain.
For their part, buyers of minor property rights housing must live with pos-
sible complications arising from ambiguous ownership and use rights. Since
the rights of buyers are not legally recognised, they have less protection
should conflicts arise with sellers and rural residents. Lawyers are hesitant
to represent them, and many local courts do not accept such cases. For
cases that make it to court, the example of Songzhuang Village in Beijing’s
Tongzhou District illustrates the problems that could face unofficial owners
of minor property rights housing. In the early 2000s, many Songzhuang vil-
lagers who had given up farming actively sought to sell or rent their property
to urban residents. They found eager buyers in a growing migrant-artist
community, and many agreements were signed. Into the mid-2000s, esca-
lating land prices provided strong motivation for villagers to unilaterally re-
tract earlier contracts signed with tenants and to demand their property
back. According to the Economic Observer, 13 artists were brought to court
by villagers in the month of October 2006 alone, including renowned painter
Fang Lijun. (15) The case that drew the most attention involved a dispute be-
tween artist Li Yulan and landowner Ma Haitao, the first of similar lawsuits
that reached an outcome and hence considered to have set an important
precedent. The two parties signed an agreement in 2002 for Li to purchase
Ma’s house for 45,000 yuan; four years later Ma wanted to buy the house
back, and at Li’s refusal, took the artist to court, exploiting the informality
of the house purchase agreement (fangwu maimai xieyi 房屋买卖协议). The
Tongzhou District Court indeed determined the agreement to be invalid and
requested Li’s evacuation, although it increased the amount of compensa-
tion that Ma should pay after Li’s appeal of the initial decision. (16) The court
based its decision on a memorandum released by the Beijing High Court
(jingaofa fa [2004] 391 hao 京高法发〔2004〕391号), which stated that
agreements concerning the private sale of villagers’ property should in prin-
ciple be considered invalid. However, the legal authority of the memoran-
dum was challenged in a letter jointly signed by more than 300 artists, who
worried that the court’s verdict might motivate more villagers to disavow
contracts and force tenants out. (17) In Beijing’s Fangshan District, the court
forced another buyer to vacate a purchased farmhouse in 2009. The villager
decided to take back the property when he learnt of the local government’s
decision to redevelop the area and the huge sum he might receive as relo-
cation compensation. (18)
While in the above cases the rights of buyers were given limited recogni-
tion in that they were given compensation, it must be noted that the ma-
jority of disputes are not resolved through formal legal procedures. The
prevalence of minor property rights housing has thus meant the rise of in-
formal power relations in society that remain outside the realm of state
governance.
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In the shadow of the law
The rampant development of minor property rights presents a difficult
governing challenge to the central state. The centre has ample cause to ban
the development of minor property rights housing. One reason is the wor-
ryingly rapid loss of farmland and the concern for safeguarding national
food security, as many illegal developments are built from farmland con-
version. In the first six years of the 1990s, 4.85 million hectares (3.6 percent)
of cultivated land had already been lost to urban development, most no-
ticeably in East and Central China. (19) The State Council and the Central Com-
mittee announced a one-year moratorium on arable land conversion in May
1997, which was subsequently extended to 1999, but tighter regulations
did not prevent a new round of the land enclosure movement (xin quandi
yundong 新圈地运动) from spreading in the early 2000s. (20) The provision
of cheaper alternative housing also challenges state planning and affects
the real estate market.
The central state has thus far come up with few effective strategies to
tackle the issue. It has relied most on the issuance of laws and regulations,
but legal announcements lack strength without consequential enforcement.
In a circular released in May 1999 targeting the heated phenomenon of
speculative land trade, the State Council explicitly stated that the trade of
farmers’ residences to urban residents is forbidden. This was reiterated in
the 2004 State Council Decision on Deepening the Reform of Land Admin-
istration (Notice 28), which prohibited urban residents from buying rural
housing land, and in the 2007 State Council notice (Notice 71), which stated
again that urban citizens are not entitled to purchase land or housing in the
countryside. In 2008, the Ministry of Land and Resources also released its
own notice (Notice 146) to clarify that minor property rights housing is not
protected by law, and that urban residents who purchase such estates can-
not obtain land use rights. (21)
The centre has also launched highly publicised campaign-style crackdowns
in select locales in the hope of achieving deterrence. These, however, have
proven short-lived and largely ineffective or even counterproductive. Vil-
lagers learning of the state’s imminent action usually engage in a race to
make their buildings even taller (qiangjian 抢建) in a bid for greater bar-
gaining power. (22) Another endemic problem is the limited reach of the cen-
tre’s governing capacity and the resultant implementation gap. The
enforcement of central directives inevitably relies on the compliant action
of government agents on the ground, but as the previous section shows,
many local officials are benefiting directly from such ventures or are caught
up in related webs of interests.
The problem of implementation aside, it is questionable whether get-
ting rid of minor property rights housing is the best solution at all. Dem-
olition is not only impractical to carry out on a large scale, but is also
likely to create conflict and threaten stability, as minor property rights
housing is providing cheap accommodation for vast populations, espe-
cially migrant workers. Given the state’s lack of progress in building af-
fordable housing, forced demolition and solutions lacking flexibility (yi
dao qie 一刀切) are likely to be met with strong resistance. The delicacy
of the matter means that the state must tread carefully and conserva-
tively between two ends of the spectrum. While granting formal recog-
nition to existing housing would imply reformational changes in the land
ownership system and encourage more such behaviour, full-scale dem-
olition would only create new housing problems and intensify social
tension.
For now, all eyes are on Shenzhen. The Special Economic Zone constitutes
a unique case, in that all land in the city has been appropriated and con-
verted into urban land by the state (referred to as Shenzhen’s “second land
reform”) and is hence, in theory, state-owned. (23) Nonetheless, according to
official statistics released in 2010, rural collectives still technically control
390 out of 917.77 square kilometres, or 42 percent, of construction land in
the city. Of this area only a quarter (95 square kilometres) is considered to
be legally held. (24)
The recently released Comprehensive Plan focuses on eight policy priori-
ties, including improving the system of property rights and fostering a more
market-led approach to land distribution. (25) More powers in land adminis-
tration will be devolved to local governments, and several neighbourhoods
have been designated as experimental zones in the management of minor
property rights housing. Nevertheless, while the broad objectives have been
laid down, the exact policies remain unclear and underspecified; a deliberate
ambiguity, perhaps, to leave room for greater flexibility in interpretation
and implementation. Although the Executive Vice-Mayor of the Shenzhen
Municipal People’s Government, Lu Ruifeng, has remarked that Shenzhen
will strike hard against illegal construction and give no leeway (jianjue daji,
bu gei chulu 坚决打击,不给出路), the Chinese saying “crossing a river by
feeling for stones” (mozhe shitou guohe 摸着石头过河) may be the wisest
guiding principle for handling this ubiquitous problem. (26)
Thus far, solutions proposed include the buying up of minor property rights
housing by state departments and the imposition of property tax on devel-
opers, but the different types of minor property rights housing requires prag-
matism and a differentiated approach rather than a one-size-fit-all fix. (27) How
minor property rights housing is dealt with in Shenzhen is expected to serve
as a measurement of the central government’s resolve in tackling the issue
and a hint of things to come for both developers and buyers nationwide.
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